2012-02-26

There will be another economic crisis in 2012. It will be bad. These are the economic lessons we should learn from it.

I'm breaking my recent silence not just to reiterate my previous predictions but also (in one of those slightly snarky, arrogant ways) to propose a solution for those in the future who may be reading this.

First of all, consider this graph:



Regular readers (whoever you people are) will recognise this graph as being part of series of posts I have made in 2011 predicting another economic downturn in 2012. This is based upon a study of Real Ten Year Bond Rates (Bonds minus annual inflation) averaged over a three month period. The methodology I use and historical graphs can be found here. Basically the conclusion I came to was this:
While recessions can occur without negative real interest rates, whenever negative real interest rates do occur, they are always followed by an eventual recession.
This conclusion is based upon the fact that every instance of negative real interest rates (which I define here as negative real 10 year bond rates) there is an eventual recession. This occurred in the following periods:

  • In March 1957, rates went negative. A recession followed in October 1957. (Rates also went negative during the recession)
  • In October 1973, rates went negative. A recession followed in January 1974.
  • In November 1978, rates went negative. A recession followed in April 1980.
  • In January 2008, rates went negative. A recession followed in April 2008.
  • In June 2011, rates went negative. I'm therefore predicting a recession to occur in 2012.
So that's what I'm predicting. I'm going to modify my superannuation exposure to conservative as a result because I see no reason why this coming recession won't be a big one and lead to another credit crisis and market crash.

Okay. So that's all that. So now let's assume you're reading from the future and the recession I predicted occurred and thus you feel somewhat interested that someone before the recession predicted it and was able to prove it in an empirical manner based upon data. Either that or you're guffawing at me for getting it wrong. However since I have little to lose and a lot to gain by making this prediction I'm obviously going to go ahead and make it.

Well then. You're from the future. You're now looking back at actions that could've prevented the recession. Had the powers-that-be the knowledge that One Salient Oversight has, what would they have done differently? In other words, what steps could've been taken to avoid the 2012 economic downturn? This is basically the reason for this post.

So in order for the downturn to be potentially avoided, there needed to be a watch placed upon negative real bond rates - in the same way as a watch is placed upon an inverted yield curve. So let's say that occurred. What would've happened?



The statistics show, as I have pointed out above, that June 2011 saw the rates go negative. From the graph above we see that in the six months leading up to that event, the following occurred:
  • 10 Year Bond Rates hovered around 3.4%, with a high of 3.58% in February 2011 and a low of 3.17% May 2011.
  • Annual inflation in that period averaged 2.4%, with annual rates increasing steadily each month from 1.1% in November 2010 to 3.1% in May 2011
After that period, from June 2011 onwards, Bond Rates have averaged 2.3%. This has occurred as a result of financial turmoil arising from the Euro crisis. Inflation has averaged 3.5% though.

The Euro crisis started in July 2011. A minor event during that time was also the US government debt ceiling crisis, whereby the market began to get riled by chances of a default (which nevertheless didn't affect US government bond yields).

But the stats show that it was inflation which increased, and this occurred between December 2010 and September 2011. So what was it that caused such an increase in consumer prices? Let's look at oil, courtesy of FRED:

There's no doubt that oil was involved in the inflation, however we don't see any real price hit until March 2011 and inflation began growing in December 2010.

So what was it that caused the inflation of 2011 Q1 and Q2?

It was QE2 - the second round of Quantitative Easing.

QE2 was an unconventional form of monetary policy that the Fed under Ben Bernanke introduced in December 2010. It involved creating money by fiat and using it to buy back government bonds. Its purpose was to increase liquidity and act as a loosening of money supply. It was enacted because the limits of conventional monetary policy had been reached, namely that the Federal Reserve Rate was essentially at zero and could not be lowered further.

Thus QE2 was a defacto lowering of interest rates.

There were fears from many, me partly included, that QE2 would result in uncontrollable inflation. This was certainly not the case as inflation since then hasn't been too high. Nevertheless, these were my own views at the time:
(All) this goes back to whether the money supply should be increased. While US inflation is low (currently 1.14%, year on year) deflation is hardly a problem just yet. Deflation hit the US economy very hard in late 2008 when the credit crisis hit, but since then prices have stabilised somewhat. Paul Krugman and others would argue that the US should actually target 4% inflation as a goal rather than as a limit, in which case Bernanke's policy is heading in the right direction. Interest rates have certainly bottomed out, but where is the deflation that can't be influenced by conventional monetary policy?

And this therefore calls to question the reason for quantitative easing. Is Bernanke aiming to stimulate the US economy or is he simply trying to maintain price stability? If it were the latter, then Bernanke is crazy since the US doesn't have a problem with price stability at the moment (unless you adhere to absolute price stability like I do, of course, but that's another topic!), which means that QE2, as an inflationary policy, is being implemented when prices are not in danger of deflating. This can only mean that Bernanke is aiming to stimulate the US economy, and this is problematic.
To be fair, at that time I was not seeing QE2 and the resulting inflation as a way of creating another recession. That was because my study of real ten year bond rates and their historical relationships to recessions had not yet been realised. I did point out that the Fed's dual mandate was problematic (I believed then, and still do now, that central banks should focus solely upon price stability, while governments should focus upon policies to encourage economic growth. This is an increasingly unfashionable belief in this day and age, though).

As for Quantitative Easing as a policy, I had and still have no real problems with it. In fact I wrote this article at the time in which I propose a more complete form of QE that could potentially replace the use of interest rates in future monetary policy. What I questioned then whether it was needed since prices weren't exactly unstable at the time.

In retrospect, however, it seems that QE2 actively caused the next economic crisis. I didn't know about real ten year bond rates at the time, but now that I do I can see what happened. QE2 pushed inflation up, created negative real ten year bond rates and, as a result, created the trigger for the 2012 downturn.

There's no doubt that many will blame the Eurozone crisis for the 2012 downturn. There's no doubt that it made conditions worse (it probably resulted in a flight to US bonds which, in turn, depressed yields) but the simple fact is that the Eurozone crisis began after rates turned negative. Here is proof:





These are screenshots taken today (2012-02-26) from Bloomberg, showing government bonds in Greece and Italy. The Greek bonds are here. The Italian ones are here.

What these unequivocally shows is that the Euro crisis had begun in July and continued apace as the year progressed. However real 10 year US bonds went negative in June, the month before the crisis began (and remember these are three-month averages). There's obviously going to be arguments as to which was the chicken and which was the egg, but there's no doubt that the problem began in the US before anything bad happened in Europe. In fact I wonder whether we could blame QE2 for the Eurozone crisis too? I'll refrain from that at the moment but I will say that I was never a fan of Europe's lax fiscal attitudes.

There's a number of implications to my argument that QE2 caused the (yet to happen) 2012 downturn.

The first is that price stability is obviously important and that a lid must be kept upon even benign levels of inflation, even in the face of high unemployment and low growth. Because unemployment had gone so high after the 2008 crash, and because GDP had declined so precipitously, the majority view eventually rejected "inflation hawks" like me. The Fed and luminaries like Paul Krugman argued that higher levels of inflation can be sustained because there was so much slack in the economy caused by the GFC. This may have a kernel of truth, but the fact remains that inflation ended up exceeding 10 year bond yields and triggering another downturn. The irony is that policies designed to improve the economy actually ended up making it worse.

The need for price stability even in the aftermath of a damaging recession certainly challenges prevailing views, especially about the nature of inflation. In the logic presented here,  12% bond rates alongside 11% inflation are to be preferred over 2% bond rates alongside 3% inflation. While my own views on inflation are unique and unlikely to be taken seriously by policy makers for some time, what this current situation does show is the need to read more into inflation than merely consumer prices -  namely that market investment decisions may be such that even "acceptable" levels of inflation (eg the 4% touted by the Fed and Krugman) may be too high if the market is ploughing too much of its funds into government bonds. Any policy that would've maintained positive real interest rates either on the inflation side (ie not initiating QE2) or on the investment side (eg substantially increasing bond issues to push rates higher) would've been better than what actually transpired.

A second implication involves the behaviour of the Fed. This is not the first time real bond rates have turned negative. the last time it happened was prior to the GFC. It looks like we've been fooled twice by the Fed on this one:

There we have it. The green line tells the story. August 2007 seems to be the key here: despite being faced with an increase in inflation (the blue line), the Fed refuses to increase the Funds rate. Inflation increases, the bond rate falls and suddenly we have negative real bond rates. A recession then hits in late 2008. The same conditions beset the US during the 1970s, though during that period inflation was far higher - as were bond rates. Twice in a row inflation exceeded bond rates and twice these conditions were followed by recessions. This behaviour was stopped, of course, by Paul Volcker and his inflation busting recession of the early 1980s and created the conditions for what is now disparagingly called "the great moderation". Certainly the recessions of the early 90s and early 2000s weren't prevented by positive real interest rates, which indicates that there are more to recessions than simply this particular trigger. Nevertheless it cannot be written off as mere chance that recessions follow negative real bond rates as clearly and as predictably as the negative yield curve.

So will we be fooled again by the Fed even after the 2012 downturn? Only if the new boss is the same as the old boss I suppose.

(By the way, the governor at the Fed in 2007 who made this decision is the same governor now who made the decision again)

As far as unemployment is concerned, I'm not changing my original prediction:
Unemployment will also likely peak between 12.1% and 18.7%, with a result around 16.9% the most likely.
You can imagine what this will do to US government debt.

I'll just finish by predicting that this downturn is likely to also change our understanding of the inverted yield curve. With the Federal Funds rate at zero there is no way that the yield curve can invert. (Of course we might be tempted to think that recessions have been solved and that we'll all experience a golden age because zero rates prevent an inverted curve, but recessions are unlikely to worry about things like this). Obviously the only thing that will change the Fed's ZIRP would be an outbreak of uncontrollable inflation. While this is still a possibility my belief is that the yield curve will end up simply becoming a straight horizontal line: Government bond rates will approach zero. This implies a huge flight into government securities, which in turn implies a market correction rivaling and maybe even exceeding that experienced in late 2008. Perhaps the 2012 downturn will be a mixture of both credit crisis and inflation.

Now the reason why I'm talking about the yield curve here is that if there is a recession then the yield curve will invert (ie turn into a horizontal line), and we know there will be a recession because real bond rates are negative, so the yield curve will become horizontal. And that's why I'm going to get my superannuation funds and other savings placed into as conservative a position as possible.

I'll just end with this graph for a laugh:

2012-02-20

2012 US Downturn still on the cards

First of all apologies to anyone who regularly turns up here on the off chance that I've actually written something. I've been very busy - and also rather happy - with a new job and that has taken up much of my time.

What of my predictions of a 2012 US Downturn? I'm still certain of it.

One of the triggers on my recession watch spreadsheet is comparing the annual inflation rate to the annual increase in Net M0 (Monetary Base minus Excess Reserves) - when inflation increases beyond Net M0 then a recession will occur (at some point).

Now this still hasn't happened yet - however my spreadsheet shows me that January 2012 was a negative month. A negative month (whereby a monthly result is annualised) will presage an eventual decline, though it may just be a bad month (as January 2011 was).

2012-01-28

I've been working

That's why I haven't been blogging lately.

2011-11-29

More on EV Batteries

I've been doing some more thinking about Electric Vehicles and the battery technology that will drive it to eventually replace internal combustion cars.

In the previous article I pointed out that Electric Vehicle Battery Packs need to have an energy density of around 675 Watt-hours per kilogram (Wh/kg) if they are to have an equal range to today's petrol-powered cars. I also pointed out that the Nissan Leaf - the world's first truly mass-produced electric car - has a battery pack with an energy density of around 131.57 Wh/kg. This means that the Leaf only has an effective range of approximately 117km (72 miles). "Range Anxiety" is truly a problem for Leaf owners - even though the total cost of charging the Leaf is lower per kilometre than the cost of filling up regular cars with petrol (the equivalent fuel efficiency for the Nissan Leaf is 2.4 litres per 100 km - 99 miles per gallon).

As a result of this study, I've done some more number crunching - this time taking into consideration various different types of vehicle. The Nissan Leaf is essentially a "Compact Car" or "C-Segment" vehicle. The other electric car that is dominating the EV market is the Mitsubishi i-Miev. The i-Miev is different to the Leaf in that it is a "Subcompact" or "B Segment" vehicle (also known as a Kei Car). This means it has a smaller engine (47kw compared to 80kw in the Leaf) and is lighter (1080kg compared to 1521kg). Thus the cars can't really be compared.

So what I did was examine the various different types of cars and work out just how much battery density needs to increase before the range of that particular vehicle class can be effectively equaled by an EV.

The image from my spreadsheet is too large to post here, so click here to see it directly. I obviously need to explain it, so have it open in one tab while looking at this page and flick between them.

Each different column colour represents a vehicle class. We have Subcompact / B Segment all the way up to Full SUV / J Segment. In each of those columns I have also included a base vehicle to use by way of comparison. Since we recently bought a VW Caddy, I decided to stick pretty much with Volkswagens as far as possible, with the notable exception of the Australian Ford Falcon and Range Rover. Each of these vehicles is given a fuel economy figure in Litres per 100km (to convert to mpg, click here). I've also included the size of each fuel tank, in both litres and in weight, as well as in kilowatt hours of storage. The cars I used all had petrol, not diesel, engines.

Column B shows energy storage in Wh/kg. This assumes that, as technology improves, more and more power is able to be stored in an EV battery.

All those numbers from column 9 downwards, and from column D onwards, are the range (in kilometres) of each vehicle class according to the energy storage numbers in column B. The most important cell in this section, and the spreadsheet, is F19, showing 117km range at 131.57 Wh/kg for a compact car. This is the base figure for the Nissan Leaf that I mentioned above and in my previous post.

The important figures are shown there in bold. I'll dot point them here:
  • Subcompact (VW Polo): 600 Wh/kg for 600km range.
  • Compact (VW Golf): 675 Wh/kg.
  • Mid Size (VW Passat): 785 Wh/kg
  • Compact SUV (VW Tiguan): 950 Wh/kg
  • Full Size (Ford Falcon): 1100 Wh/kg
  • Mid SUV (VW Toureag): 1300 Wh/kg
  • Full SUV (Range Rover): 2800 Wh/kg
As you can see, it is obvious that 675 Wh/kg may be enough to completely control the Subcompact and Compact markets, but as soon as you take bigger vehicles into consideration, the energy density needs to be higher. And this shows how the market will react as time goes by: the smaller, lighter vehicles will become more dominated by EVs than the bigger, heavier vehicles.

I've also placed another figure to look at: the energy density needed for the vehicle to have a range of 1000km. This is an important figure (though arbitrary) that will affect EV design. If we assume, for example, that battery energy density reaches 1300 Wh/kg (and thus control the mid sized SUV market), what would happen to the subcompact market? Well according to the spreadsheet, such a vehicle would have a range of 1300km, more than twice what is probably needed. When this occurs, it is very likely that EVs will have less space dedicated to battery packs and more space dedicated to other aspects, such as greater boot space and leg room. Thus the cars will have an ever increasing usability.

This is not outside the realms of possibility. Think about the battery packs needed to power your mobile phone or laptop - they have been decreasing in size and increasing in energy intensity for some time. The same should be true for EV battery packs.

Now the second part of the graph needs some explanation. It is essentially the application of Moore's Law to battery technology in column B (column C is the multiplier for the spreadsheet, so ignore that unless you wish to check my figures - which you are welcome to). Moore's Law, in this case, assumes that battery energy density will double every two years. If we take this year (2011) to be the year when battery packs of 131.57 Wh/kg are currently available to the market (ie the battery packs for the Nissan Leaf), then you can see the sort of battery energy density that could be theoretically available as years go by.

If we take...
  • a range of 300km to be the sort the market will respond to positively (and thus begin to be competitive with petrol driven vehicles),
  • and if we see a range of 600km to be the sort that will completely control the market (and make petrol driven vehicles obsolete),
  • and a range of 1000km to be the point at which these vehicles begin to reduce the amount of space needed for battery packs (and thus increase usability by having more space),
  • and if we apply Moore's Law to battery technology...

...then we will see the following:

  • Subcompact EVs will begin to be used in number from 2014. They will begin to control the market in 2016. They will begin to increase usability from 2017 onwards.
  • Compact EVs will begin to be used in number from 2014. They will begin to control the market in 2016. They will begin to increase usability from 2018 onwards.
  • Mid-Size EVs will begin to be used in number from 2015. They will begin to control the market in 2016/2017. They will begin to increase usability from 2018 onwards.
  • Compact SUEVs will begin to be used in number from 2015. They will begin to control the market in 2017. They will begin to increase usability from 2019 onwards.
  • Full Size EVs will begin to be used in number from 2015. They will begin to control the market in 2017. They will begin to increase usability from 2019 onwards.
  • Mid-Size SUEVs will begin to be used in number from 2016. They will begin to control the market in 2018. They will begin to increase usability from 2020 onwards.
  • Full-Size SUEVs will begin to be used in number from 2018. They will begin to control the market in 2020. They will begin to increase usability from 2022 onwards.
Now I don't really know too much about how the car market reacts to new vehicles and how long it takes for them to be taken up by the market, but it is probably likely that 2014-2016 will be the years when the electric car begins to hit world markets in number.

2011-11-17

Battery technology is the key to EV Growth

In order for Electric Vehicles to enter the mainstream and compete equally with petroleum powered vehicles, battery technology must improve.

I consider the Nissan Leaf to be the one of the most important electric vehicles on the market today. Unlike the Prius or even the Volt, the Leaf is not a hybrid electric vehicle but a completely electric one. It is powered by an electric motor and energy is stored in the car's battery packs. The Leaf will not need to be "filled up" with petroleum, it needs to be plugged in to ensure that its rechargeable batteries have enough juice to keep the Leaf going.

The problem is that, while the cost of charging a car with electricity is very low compared to the cost of filling up a car with petroleum, the range of the Leaf is disconcertingly small. "Range anxiety" prevents many Leaf owners today from driving their vehicles beyond the normal commute. As a result it is more likely to be owned by people who already own petroleum powered cars that have greater range that they can use when needed. Nissan says that the Leaf's range is 160km but that is a very optimistic figure which does not take into account normal driving patterns: an "eco" mode ensures that acceleration is lower than it could be. In "normal" mode, and taking into account the need for air conditioning, heating, and music, the range of the Leaf is more likely to average out at 117km.

(Such normal driving patterns also lower the range of petroleum powered vehicles as well - it's just that we don't notice it too much because the car's range is still reasonably high).

After consulting the specs of my own comparable vehicle (A Mitsubishi Lancer) I have determined that modern cars need a range of around 600km. This would mean that, in order to properly compete, the Nissan Leaf's batteries would need to store 5.128205128 times more energy than it does currently.

And this is where the engineering challenges can be quantified.

The Automotive Energy Supply Corporation (AESC) is the company that builds the Battery Packs for the Nissan Leaf. Have a look at the specs on their product here.

From these specs we notice a number of things:
  1. The Nissan Leaf does not have one battery pack, but 48 individual packs located under the car's floor.
  2. According to the Leaf's specs, the total amount of energy stored in these 48 packs is 24 kilowatt hours (Kw/h).
  3. Therefore, each battery pack contains, on average, 500 W/h.
  4. Each individual battery pack weighs 3.8kg.
  5. Therefore, the energy density of each battery pack is 131.57 W/h per kilogram.
So in order for the Leaf to have a 600km range, each battery pack should store 2.56 Kw/h of energy, which means that the energy density of these battery packs must increase to approximately 675 Wh/kg (while assuming no increase in volume).

Of course battery technology is progressing in leaps and bounds - anyone who owns a mobile phone or laptop knows that storage capacity has improved considerably over the last five years. Nevertheless while the technology is moving forward, we need to remember that there is usually a lag between the technology being discovered and its ability to be mass produced at a reasonably low price.

I am quite confident that these technological and industrial goals can be met some time in the next 10-12 years.

2011-10-25

How I would solve the EU Sovereign Bond Crisis and stop it from happening again

  1. Pool all sovereign debt into a central fund. At the end of 2010, this amount totaled €7,822,443 million. Source.
  2. This central fund will be run by a supranational entity under the control of the European Union, much like the ECB.
  3. A Eurozone-wide financial services tax is introduced. This would be based upon either a Tobin Tax or a Market Capitalisation Tax. The purpose of this tax would be to pay off the sovereign debt that has been pooled into the central fund.
  4. Because nation governments have shown that they cannot be trusted to maintain the fiscal agreements of the Maastricht Treaty, a Eurozone-wide supranational entity - let's call it the European Revenue Service, or ERS - is set up to a) determine a nation's tax rates, and b) take over the tax collection duties of member nations. This will necessitate the ceding of tax setting and tax collecting by all levels of Eurozone government.
Let me expand on these idea further.

The central fund and the financial services tax.
The pooling of debt into a single fund and then paying it off by a Tobin tax or Market Capitalisation tax takes care of the current mess. Individual Euro governments will no longer be responsible for the debt that they have accrued up until this point. It's a way of both "cleaning the slate and starting again" while still setting up structures to ensure that the debt gets paid off (and not defaulted upon). Moreover, the tax that is instituted is aimed squarely at the financial industry (who helped set up the current crisis) rather than upon ordinary wage earners. A central Eurozone-wide fund is better than a series of national funds simply because the central fund (preferably backed by the ECB) would be given clear parameters and not be subject to the whims of individual nations.

The short-term goal of the fund is to provide market confidence in the payback of sovereign debt.
The long-term goal of the central fund is to pool together and eventually retire all levels of Eurozone sovereign debt by way of a financial services tax
.

The European Revenue Service.
The setting up of the ERS is certainly a controversial proposal - but it is a proposal that will ensure that this crisis never occur again. Ceding the sovereign authority  to set and collect taxes may sound frightening to those who do not support an ever-closer union, or who think the EU should no longer exist. Yet it is essential for the future of the EU - since it will prevent the blowing out of sovereign debt again.

Under this system, each member country has the power to spend as much they usually do - the ERS will not be responsible for spending decisions. What each nation will no longer have is the ability to set tax rates or tax law or have the ability to collect taxes - these things will be left to the ERS. The ERS will then set tax rates and tax laws for each member nation of the Eurozone to match the amount of spending they indulge in. Scandinavian nations, like Finland or Sweden, will continue to have big spending governments, which means that the ERS will set up high tax rates in those nations. Nations who have smaller governments in proportion to the economy will have lower tax rates. If a country decides to expand government spending, then the ERS will naturally increase the taxes in that nation over the long term; similarly, if a nation decides to cut spending, then the ERS will lower taxes over time. If a nation wants to "run a surplus" in order to create a sovereign wealth fund, then they will simply file this investment under spending, and the ERS will set taxes accordingly.

The ERS will also be the supranational tax collection agency, ensuring that the same quality of operations exists across the entire Eurozone.

The ERS will also have the authority to change tax rates in individual nations, or across the entire Eurozone, in response to certain economic conditions such as recessions or expansions. This would be done in conjunction with the ECB. Keynesian stimuli enacted by member nations will also be conducted in conjunction with ERS policy.

Individual nations can "reduce taxes" on certain industries if they wish through subsidies, which would have a net effect upon the taxes on that industry.

The short-term goal of the ERS would be to set tax rates in member countries, collect them and distribute them to these member countries.
The long term goal of the fund is to ensure that all nations maintain zero net sovereign debt over the course of the business cycle.


Notes:

The fund and the ERS will only operate within the Eurozone. Members of the EU who are not members of the Eurozone will not be subject to these entities (eg UK, Denmark). However, once an EU country joins the Eurozone, these policies will affect them: their sovereign debt will be transferred to the central pool and their tax system will be run by the ERS. The idea that sovereign debt may be paid off on entry to the Eurozone gives potential member nations a huge incentive to join.

As for the importance of government bonds in the European Financial industry, the ECB would be able to issue enough bonds to cover this need. Just because debt is being/has been retired does not mean that government bonds need to disappear as well.

2011-10-20

US Recession Indicators - October 2011

According to data from negative Real Interest Rates, another US recession is likely to begin between now and 2012 Q4, with 2012 Q1 the most likely... See below.


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Net Monetary Base vs Inflation (spread)

The growth of the Net Monetary base (M0 minus excess reserves) over inflation has been above the historical average since September 2010 and has remained high at 659 in September 2011.

These results continue to be high and any future recession will either be delayed or else the results will begin to drop drastically.

Already there has been two months of straight decline in both M0 and Excess Reserves (2011-08 and 2011-09 results). Nevertheless Net M0 remains positive because reserves had declined faster than M0.

Inflation in September was 3.9%, the highest it has been since October 2008. This is the third straight month of price increases since a deflationary monthly result in June. The rate of monthly inflation has decreased however, with 6% in July, 4.5% in August and 3.6% in September.

Note: A negative result implies that inflation is growing faster than the money supply, an event which indicates that a recession will occur within 1 to 36 months (with an average of 12 months)
Note: All recessions are preceded by a negative result.


Data Series:
St Louis Fed

AMBNS
EXCRESNS
CPIAUCSL
GDPC1
POP
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Federal Funds Rate vs 10 Year Bond Rate (spread)

September ended with a reading of 190 after 10 year bond rates continued to decline. This is the lowest spread since May 2008. The recent decline is increasingly precipitous.

What I said in August needs to be remembered:

If this indicator stays true to its historical data, then there will be one of two events leading up to the beginning of the recession.

The first is if the Federal Reserve will keep the Federal Funds rate effectively at zero, which it will do barring any major inflationary outbreak. If this occurs then 10 year bond rates will drop to zero as well, or at least converge to within a few basis points. This appears to be the situation currently.

The second event will occur if the Federal Reserve increases rates in response to an outbreak of inflation. If this occurs then the Federal Funds rate will exceed the 10 year bond rate, thus placing the indicator into negative and presaging a recession. Inflation has been increasing markedly in the last six months, so this event may yet be the result.
Will Ten Year Bond rates drop to zero? Or will there be an outbreak of inflation first?
Note: A negative result implies a highly restrictive monetary environment, an event which indicates that a recession will occur within 4 to 39 months (with an average of 22 months).

Note: If both the first and second graphs are negative at the same time it indicates that a recession will occur within 1 to 21 months (with an average of 11 months).

Note: All recessions are preceded by a negative result.



Data Series:
St Louis Fed

FEDFUNDS
GS10
GDPC1
POP

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Real 10 Year Bond Rates Rates

Real Ten Year Bond rates came in at -1.32% in September. As I have pointed out before, all experiences of negative 10 year bond rates since the 1950s have resulted in an eventual recession.

If we take previous instances of negative real bond rates into account, a recession will begin between now and 2012 Q4, with 2012 Q1 the most likely. These previous experiences also indicate that unemployment will also likely peak between 12.1% and 18.7%, with a result around 16.9% the most likely.
Note: Real Interest Rates based upon 10 year Bonds can indicate how the value of money is determined in comparison with the market's safest investment. A negative result implies that inflation is eroding the savings of those who have invested in 10 Year Bonds. A negative result over a three month average indicates that a recession may occur between 4-18 months, with an average of 8½ months and a median of 6 months.

Note: Not all recessions are preceded by negative real 10 year bond rates. Nevertheless all instances of negative 10 year bond rates (since the 1950s) have been followed by a recession.



Data Series:
St Louis Fed

GS10
CPIAUCSL
GDPC1
POP


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Market Capitalisation adjusted by USDX




(The orange line is the recession line, the red line is the line of resistance)

Data Sources




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2011-10-19

Cost of US oil consumption as percentage of GDP

The most recent figure is for 2011-Q2, which comes in at 1.17%.

With oil prices now $20 cheaper than 2011-Q2, 2011-Q3 will likely see a drop.

Methodology:

The average oil price for the quarter is multiplied by oil consumption for the quarter, which is then measured as a percentage of nominal GDP.

Sources:
  • West Texas Intermediate, price averaged out for quarterly figure. Link.
  • US Oil Consumption, quarterly. Link.
  • Nominal GDP, quarterly. Link.
Notes:
  • Orange lines represent recessions (annual decline of real GDP per capita)
  • Yellow line represents historical average of 0.82% of GDP.

2011-10-10

US Defense Cost Overruns: F-35 vs F4

The F-35 is a fighter-bomber aircraft that will be used by three of the four branches of the armed forces. The last time the Air Force, Navy and Marines had the same jet fighter was back in the 1960s when they all adopted the F-4 Phantom II fighter-bomber.

A good way to determine just how bad defense cost overruns are is to compare the relative cost of the F-35 with the F-4.

Of course there are a number of determining factors. One is the fact that inflation has distorted prices somewhat since the mid 1960s. Another is that real GDP has grown significantly in that time. The final thing to realise is that technology since then has improved markedly, thus granting "more bang for the buck" so to speak. So let's play with these adjustments:
  • F-4E Phantom II "flyaway cost" in 1965 was $2.4 million (wikipedia source)
  • Nominal GDP in 1965 Q4 was $747.5 Billion. (St Louis Fed source)
  • The cost of a single F-4E Phantom II thus represented approximately 0.00032% of GDP.
  • Adjusted for inflation, the cost of a single F-4E Phantom II in 2010 dollars is approximately $16.4 million (inflation calculator)
  • F-35A Lightning II "flyaway cost" in 2011 is $122 million (wikipedia source)
  • Nominal GDP in 2011 Q2 was $15,012.8 Billion (St Louis Fed source)
  • The cost of a single F-35A Lightning II thus represents approximately 0.00081% of GDP.
  • The cost of 0.00032% of GDP in 2011 Q2 was $48 million.
  • The F-35A is, in dollar figures, 644% more costly than a F-4E.
  • The F-35A is, in percentage of GDP, 154% more costly than a F-4E

So naturally the question arises: is one F-35A better than 2.5 aircraft that could've been built at lower cost but with far better technology that was ever available for the F-4? Or, better still, is one F-35A better than 7.4 of these aircraft?

The idea I'm trying to promote here is not a return to building F-4s, nor whether it would be better to build increasingly obsolete F-18s, F-16s or F-15s instead. Rather I'm trying to point out that a cheaper alternative could've been built than the F-35, and that this theoretical alternative would've replaced the F-18s, F-16s or F-15s.

This theoretical aircraft would not cost $122 million (like the F-35A), but be between $16.4m - $48m. While the chances are that this theoretical aircraft would be inferior in some ways to the F-35, it would still be superior to the aircraft it replaces and probably still be one of the best aircraft around.

Maybe the Pentagon should focus its attention upon cost, and let the developers and engineers work within that framework.

EDIT: Since the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet currently costs $55 million each, maybe it should replace all the obsolete fighter-bombers currently in service in the Air Force, Navy and Marines?

EDIT 2: Fixed up the last two dot points above to read "more costly than" rather than "the value of".

2011-10-05

Market Failure

When a market is dominated by a monopoly or a cartel, and they use their market powers to reduce supply in order to boost their own profitability, then the market has failed.

Were Cali Dairy Cows Slaughtered to Raise the Price of Dairy?